David Rothman, professor of social medicine at Columbia University and director of the Center on Medicine as a Profession, said: «What it`s really about is selling organs from living donors. There are very, very good reasons – many from behavioral economics, others from the past – that suggest that creating a market could reduce supply, not increase it. First and foremost, if I can buy it, why should I give it away?. In England, where the sale of blood was not allowed, donation rates were considerably higher than in the United States, where the sale of blood was allowed. Do you need a kidney? In the world`s largest organ market, many arguments have been made against a system of incentives, none of which are convincing. I have divided them into five categories (Table 1 et seq.). We already accept unpaid kidney donations; Therefore, any convincing argument against the sale must always allow for a donation. New Jersey man sues for right to sell organs, argues 1984 law banning organ trafficking is unconstitutional Sally Satel, a psychiatrist and scientist at the American Enterprise Institute who received a kidney from a friend in 2006, said, «Despite decades of public education about the virtues of organ donation, The waiting list is growing. And the time until transplantation is getting longer and longer. It is high time to face the fact that altruism is simply not enough. Many people need to give more incentives. And that`s why we need to be able to compensate people who are willing to donate a kidney to a stranger to save a life. We are not talking about a traditional trade show, an open market or an eBay system.
We are talking about a third-party payer. For example, today you might decide to donate a kidney. They would be called a good Samaritan donor. The only difference in a model I can think of is where you donate your organ, and your retirement account is transferred to $40,000, end of story. «However, systems like the U.S. and similar systems like the U.K. are not the only viable options. While these are the most globally accepted ways to meet the demand for organs, they are not the only ones; Iran has its own method of dealing with demand. Beginning in 1988, Iran launched a program to compensate donors for organ donation, eliminating the waiting list for kidney transplants. Under the current system, buyers and sellers can buy and sell kidneys at a fixed price of $4,600.
Although parallel exploitation agreements have been concluded outside the state-regulated system, Iran has been able to avoid many of the ethical problems that often arise from the sale of organs. For example, one study found that while the majority of kidneys sold in Iran came from people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, everyone, rich or poor, could have equal access to kidney transplants thanks to funding from nonprofits. As mentioned earlier, a financially desperate person who donates organs often leads to poor health outcomes, making that person even more economically unstable. However, in the Iranian system, donors enjoy health insurance for at least one year after surgery and reduced coverage for an additional period after the end of this coverage. Although the system is not perfect, it allows those who need kidneys to access it relatively easily and reduces the exploitation of the poor that prevails in countries such as Pakistan and the Philippines. It is estimated that if the U.S. established a similar legal market for the sale of kidneys and paid donors $45,000, it would not only eliminate the waiting list for kidneys, but would also save taxpayers $12 billion a year. The situation has recently sparked a debate about what was once unthinkable – paying people for organ donation. Six pundits recently addressed this emotional issue in an Oxford-style debate, the latest of this season`s events in the series Intelligence Squared U.S. The whole argument for legal organ trafficking seems inherently unethical: selling your own body parts that are part of your identity for profit.
However, opening the market to the legal kidney trade in the U.S. will likely save more lives, but at what cost? Here are the arguments: «Dirty Pretty Things» and the law: curing America`s organ shortage and health crisis. Transplantation professionals are increasingly pushing to legalize the direct sale of human organs from living donors. This movement is gaining momentum and should receive the necessary support from policymakers to modify NOTA to allow the exchange of human organs in exchange for valuable quid pro quos. If such an exchange is allowed, this article postulates that living organ donors should only be able to receive a benefit in kind in exchange for their organs – in particular, comprehensive health care throughout life. This would minimize the health crisis in the United States and continue to prevent the exploitation of poor Americans. This proposal would also effectively reduce the number of deaths in the United States due to organ shortages, while reducing the number of deaths caused by the lack of adequate health care. In order to advance such a proposal, NOTE must be amended to allow the exchange of human organs for the valuable examination of comprehensive health care throughout life. The arguments without supporting data are as follows: a) If there were sales, the donation would decrease. Even if this were true, if the total number of organs available increased, it would not matter; In addition, it would be good to remove family pressure to donate, which could contribute to much of what we currently consider «altruistic» donations. and possibly eliminating the use of ECD kidneys would improve the overall result of the transplant.
(b) Giving must be purely altruistic (there is no reason for this to be the case, and it is likely that there are many reasons beyond pure altruism why individuals donate ). (c) The traditional doctor-patient relationship would be damaged (this does not apply to egg donation [which requires surgery] or surrogacy). Essentially, the pros and cons of advocating for a legal organ market are difficult to assess. Monetary rewards for organs cause problems where the poor are disadvantaged. Yet paying donors is an easy way to dramatically increase organ reserves, potentially saving thousands of lives each year. In both cases, there will be ethical dilemmas. However, it is clear that if the U.S. wants to abolish the current waiting list, something has to change.
If it is heavily regulated, it is not impossible to have a system that eliminates the waiting list for kidneys and protects donors from exploitation. Iran is a prime example; On this basis, the United States, as well as other countries currently struggling to meet the demand for organs, could use the Iranian model to meet demand and reduce the exploitation risks often associated with the organ market. He seems hopeful that in the coming years, as research continues on this topic, a more viable solution to the demand for organs in the United States will be implemented. A glimpse into the murky world of illegal organ trafficking Should people be paid for organ donation? iStockphoto Hide caption Those who oppose a regulated sales system imply that they are morally superior by protecting the potential paid donor (from exploitation? from the harm of an operation?) or by protecting society (from the loss of human dignity?). However, the end result is that they sentence many of our transplant candidates to death. Legalizing the sale of organs will increase the supply of organs. This means shorter waiting lists for those waiting for donations. This means more people can get life-saving transplants. Allowing a private organ market to coexist with a donation system also means that those who can least afford it will have better access to organ donation, as the wealthiest pay for the luxury of not having to wait for a government body. A private market will mean new sources of supply, as those who do not currently donate for altruistic reasons will be encouraged by the pursuit of profit.
The majority of those who have currently opted for organ donation are likely to continue to do so, regardless of the possibility of financial rewards.